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Abstract
We investigate knowledge exchange among commercial organisations, the rationale behind it and its effects on the market.
Knowledge exchange is known to be beneficial for industry, but in order to explain it, authors have used high level concepts like
network effects, reputation and trust. We attempt to formalise a plausible and elegant explanation of how and why companies
adopt information exchange and why it benefits the market as a whole when this happens. This explanation is based on a multi-
agent model that simulates a market of software providers. Even though the model does not include any high-level concepts,
information exchange naturally emerges during simulations as a successful profitable behaviour. The conclusions reached by this
agent-based analysis are twofold: (1) A straightforward set of assumptions is enough to give rise to exchange in a software market.
(2) Knowledge exchange is shown to increase the efficiency of the market.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The growth of the Internet as a medium of knowledge
exchange has stimulated a lot of scientific interest originat-
ing from various disciplines. The willingness of individuals,
organisations as well as commercial firms to share informa-
tion via the Internet has been remarkable. In some sectors
like scientific research, the communication of newly acquired
knowledge and expertise in a field is considered vital for their
advancement. On the other hand, in other sectors, the benefits
of such exchanges may not be obvious. For instance, it might
even be considered damaging for pharmaceutical companies to
make public any innovations generated by their Research and
Development (R&D) process. In spite of this view, exchange of
intellectual property in some industries occurs quite frequently
and in various different ways. These include the forming of
strategic partnerships, the participation in open source software
projects and the publication of scientific papers by research
labs that are part of commercial companies.
We study the knowledge exchange that occurs in the
software industry. In particular, we focus on analysing the
rationale behind this exchange as well as its effect on the
industry. The complexity of software requirements is a char-
acteristic that distinguishes the software market from others.
However, the findings of this work might be relevant to other
industries as well. This effort fits within the framework of the
Digital Business Ecosystem (DBE) project. The DBE project
is an attempt to develop a distributed environment which will
interlink European Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) that
are software providers and foster collaboration between them.
Our broader interest lies in understanding the dynamics of
ecosystems [11], [15], [43]. Furthermore, we are interested in
analysing the global system properties which emerge from the
interactions that occur in a market ecosystem. We have been
using techniques from agent based modelling to simulate the
DBE environment. The main aspects of the DBE market are
captured in a model where the SMEs are agents with bounded
rationality. This model is then studied using simulations of
various settings, and a number of observations are made. One
of the most interesting observations is that exchanges between
the agents similar to the ones that happen in real-life arise in
the system. This behaviour emerges in the market even though
the model does not explicitly account for social issues of trust,
network effects or managerial strategies.
The paper is organised as follows. The following section
gives an insight to the Digital Business Ecosystem project
and the characteristic of the market that will be developed.
In section III we sketch the background of this work, namely
we review the types of exchanges that occur in markets, giving
particular attention to the software market. Section IV details
the model used for the investigation carried out. Section V
analyses the experiments performed and the results produced
and section VI concludes.
II. DIGITAL BUSINESS ECOSYSTEM
In this section we give a brief overview of the Digital
Business Ecosystem project, highlighting its aims and motiva-
tion. The characteristics of the end-product are identified and
special attention is given to the efficiency of the market that
will be formed.
A. A DBE Economy
It is stated in [35] that virtual organisations make dynamic
coalitions of small groups possible. In this way the companies
involved can provide more services and make more profits.
Moreover, such coalitions can disband when they are no
longer effective. At present, coalition formation for virtual
organisations is limited, with such organisations largely static.
The overall goal of the DBE project 1 [13] is to launch
a new technology paradigm for the creation of a digital
business ecosystem that will interlink SMEs and especially
software providers. The project is encompassed by the Eu-
ropean Union’s initiative to become a leader in the field
of software application development and to strengthen its
SME industry. An open source distributed environment will
support the spontaneous evolution, adaptation and composition
of software components and services, allowing SMEs that are
solution and e-business service providers to cooperate in the
production of components and applications adapted to local
business needs. This will allow small software providers in
Europe to leverage new distribution channels providing niche
services in local ecosystems and extending their market reach
through the DBE framework. Easy access and large availability
of applications, adapted to local SMEs, will foster adoption
of technology and local economic growth. It will change the
way SMEs and EU software providers use and distribute their
products and services.
The main objective of this work, which was carried out as
part of the DBE project, was to study the properties of this new
type of market. It is clear that the interactions and exchanges
between the SMEs within the Digital Business Ecosystem
environment will have an effect on the dissemination of
information and subsequently to the efficiency of the market.
B. Market Efficiency
Within the environment of the DBE, business alliances,
networks and supply chains require much less effort to be
1The web page of the project can be found at www.digital-ecosy
2formed. This will promote cooperation and easier dissemina-
tion of information between the member SMEs. On the other
hand, competition for a share of the market between SMEs will
become more direct. It is to be hoped, that these factors will
raise the levels of efficiency in the DBE market in comparison
to a traditional market. While these aspects of the DBE are
very interesting and the subject of future research, this work
studies how market efficiency is affected by the exchange
of information between SMEs. The experiments carried out
on our model, confirm that as the agents engage in more
information exchanges between them, with time the market
efficiency of the system rises.
Efficient Markets Theory, as proposed by [19], is a field of
economics which seeks to explain the operation of an asset
market. Specifically, it states that at any given time, the price
of an asset reflects all available information [3], [12]. The
efficient market hypothesis implies that it is not generally
possible to make above-average returns in the stock market
over the long term by trading lawfully, except through luck or
by obtaining and trading on inside information.
The DBE environment is different from an asset market, so
the definition of efficiency needs to be modified, retaining the
spirit of the efficient market hypothesis. In the model of the
DBE used in this work, the market is driven by demand which
is fixed and unaffected by the supplied DBE services. In this
case the market is efficient if, at any given time, the supply of
a service reflects all available information. This means that,
the services supplied are such that they satisfy the underlying
market needs optimally. In other words, the SMEs are not
concentrating on catering for some needs while others are left
unsatisfied. In an efficient DBE market, all the needs will be
satisfied evenly, assuming that there is equal demand for each
of them. To draw a parallel between the traditional definition
of an efficient asset market and the proposed definition for
the efficiency of the DBE market consider the following. In
an inefficient asset market, a trading agent can earn excessive
returns by buying a particular stock which she believes to
be undervalued. Similarly, in an inefficient DBE market a
company might make excessive profits by satisfying a need
which it knows is not sufficiently satisfied. To invert the
argument, in an efficient asset market, asset prices adjust in-
stantaneously and in an unbiased fashion to publicly available
new information, so that no excess returns can be earned by
trading on that information. Similarly, in an efficient DBE
market, the supply of services will adjust immediately to any
arising information about the underlying needs.
Cooperation, symbiosis [16], [27] as well as the efficiency
[37], [40] of adaptive multi-agent systems has been studied in
the context of the simple games. In [40] no verifiable definition
of efficiency is given, whereas in [37] the system is considered
to be in an efficient market phase when all information that
can be used by the agents’ strategies is traded away, and
no agent can accumulate more points than an agent making
random guesses would. In the work presented in this paper,
market efficiency, cooperation and competition are studied in
the context of a more realistic economic market.
III. BACKGROUND
In this section we list a number of ways in which exchange
of knowledge between companies happens in a market and the
rationale for each of them is briefly reviewed. As this work
focuses on SMEs that are software providers, we survey the
key characteristics of the software industry and the exchanges
in this particular market.
A. Exchange in economic markets
In an economic market there are many ways in which the
firms engage in exchanges between them. These include the
forming of strategic partnerships, the participation in open
source software projects and the publication of scientific
papers by research companies like HP Labs and Microsoft Re-
search. In the paragraphs that follow we will briefly examine
the rationale behind these different forms of exchange.
For a strategic partnership to be formed, the partners must
mutually benefit from the experience, expertise and talent that
all the parties bring to the partnership. There usually is an
immediate worthy goal or objective that the partners concerned
wish to achieve. For instance, they may wish to operate in
a new market, or to bring about a change of leadership in
the industry they operate in. Hagedoorn in [24] reports a
dramatic rise especially in R&D partnerships, over the past
40 years. These partnerships are mostly limited-time project
based collaborations as opposed to long-term alliances. The
main motives behind them are reported to be related to cost-
cutting as well as risk minimisation whilst the partners attempt
to enter new technological areas.
Recent economics and management research has studied
the phenomenon of commercial firms contributing to open
source projects. The main motive indicated by these analyses
is strategic [22], as set out in more detail in section III-B
where the specifics of the software industry are analysed. This
seems to be consistent with the fact that it is not the leaders
in the industry who engage in open source development, but
the followers.
Another form of exchange, which at first might seem
counter-intuitive, is the publication of scientific papers con-
taining the findings of the research commercial companies
perform. It may be argued that it would be in the interest of
those companies, to keep their innovative work to themselves.
Another argument, however, is that by publicising their re-
search they invite others to endorse it, add to it and in effect
advance it further. Then, they can use the knowledge acquired
by this process to better their products.
The model of a software market that we propose as part
of this work is simple in the sense that the agents/firms do
not have the ability to reason about complex situations. They
cannot make decisions to operate in new markets, or form
partnerships in order to change the leadership in the industry.
They cannot devise strategies to undercut their competitors.
However, they operate in a capitalistic economy where the
best of them succeed whilst the worst perish. They are
thus equipped with a simplistic mechanism of reinforcement
learning, i.e. being rewarded or punished for choices that prove
to be good or bad respectively. When given the opportunity
3to engage in exchange of services between them, they learn
with time under which circumstances this is beneficial to them
and they proceed with it without ever being biased by external
factors towards exchanging.
B. The software industry
Complexity is a key characteristic of software which dis-
tinguishes the software industry from others. Typical software
products carry a large number of features, with innumerable
[2] interactions between them. For a program to be successful
in the market, it is necessary that it has the right set of features
to satisfy the customer base and that these features operate
successfully together.
The market of proprietary software providers/publishers is
dominated by large companies, not SMEs. Microsoft Corpo-
ration holds the lion’s share in the software market with com-
panies like Oracle, IBM, Hewlett-Packard and Sun following
with smaller shares2.
At the same time, the open source3 movement has been quite
successful in developing relatively complex software products
like Linux, Apache or sendmail that are serious competitors of
well established proprietary software [38]. Networks of thou-
sands of volunteers have contributed to these highly complex
products. This appears, as it is pointed out in [2], to counter
the economic intuition that private agents, without property
rights, will not invest sufficient effort in the development of
public goods because of free-rider externalities.
Lerner and Tirole in [33] justify the volunteers’ motivation
for contribution to the open source movement as an oppor-
tunity to ‘signal their quality’. In other words, the volunteers
believe it will enhance their career prospects, as the names
of the contributors are always listed in open source projects.
Other individual motivations, like altruism or opportunity to
express creativity are also mentioned.
It is important to point out that in recent years, open source
projects have not only received contributions by individuals.
There have been organised efforts by firms like Sun, IBM
and others that have endorsed such projects. The survey [6]
conducted among firms, as well as the account of [20] of
Sun Microsystems and [22] list strategic reasons behind the
motivation of firms to contribute to open source projects. These
reasons include efforts to undercut rival products, gaining a
wider tester base for their own products, initiating a gift econ-
omy culture between the firm and the open source developer
community (where the firm provides the software for free and
the community provides debugging or more source code in
return) and giving out the software to clients in order to charge
for its maintenance and support.
2The information reflects the year 2002-2003 and was obtained from IBIS
World, a strategic business information provider.
http://www.ibisworld.com/snapshot/industry/default.asp?page=industry&industry id=1239
accessed on 27/05/2005.
3In open source software, the source code for a program is made open
and available for anyone to screen. There are different open source licenses
which prescribe what one is allowed to do with the source code e.g.
screen it, interpret it, make changes etc. This is in contrast to proprietary
software licenses where the source code is protected by property rights against
modification.
Previous work in this area includes that of Johnson in [28]
and Bessen in [2] who have used mathematical models to
explain the emergence of the open source initiative. John-
son focuses more on analysing the individual motives and
establishing the relationship between the size of the developer
base and whether the development goes on. On the other
hand, Bessen concentrates on the firm motives for participation
in open source initiatives. Bessen, models software as a bit
string, each bit being a certain feature of the software. In
this way the notion that the number of combinations of
features grows exponentially with the number of features is
captured, depicting the complexity the software can have.
In his work, he compares open source development with
proprietary, pre-packaged provision of software and concludes
that the two complement each other, recognising that they
serve different groups of customers. The latter suits customers
with standard, non-complex software needs, while the former
serves customers who have software development capabilities
and who need more complex software products.
Bonaccorsi and Rossi in [5] have designed a multi-agent
system simulation with which they explore the circumstances
for adoption of open source software. They also conclude that
proprietary and open source software will coexist in the future.
Their model of the diffusion of the two competing streams of
software production takes into account issues like the effect of
advertising, network externalities and achievement of critical
mass as in [34].
The stylised model presented in this work simulates a
market in which the companies try to satisfy a set of un-
derlying software needs with the services that they develop.
The companies follow simple, high-level rules imposed by
a capitalistic economy. Interestingly, exchanges between the
agents similar to the ones that happen in real software markets,
arise in the system. This behaviour emerges in the system
even though we have avoided modelling issues like social or
strategic motives of the contributors or network effects.
IV. AN AGENT-BASED MODEL OF THE DBE
A. Agent-based Modelling
Agent-based modelling has been recently used in Eco-
nomics research work to study models of markets, e.g. the
Santa Fe artificial stock market [4], [32], and their character-
istics [31], in Computing-Economics interdisciplinary work to
study information economies of autonomous agents [14], [23],
[29], [30], [39] and business processes [26], in Social Sciences
to study emergent behaviour [17], issues of trust [18] and to
perform syndromic behaviour surveillance [10] and in other
disciplines.
Much research in multi-agent systems explores how refine-
ments to one agent’s reasoning can affect the performance
of the system [8]. Significant effort has been directed towards
formally defining emergence in agent-based systems. A strong
emergent property is a property of the system that cannot
be found in the properties of the system’s parts or in the
interactions between the parts [1]. Additionally, in [42] the
notion of universality is studied: systems whose elements
differ widely may have common emergent features.
4Agent-based modelling according to [41] “is a method for
studying systems exhibiting the following two properties:
1) the system is composed of interacting agents; and
2) the system exhibits emergent properties, that is, prop-
erties arising from the interactions of the agents that
cannot be deduced simply by aggregating the properties
of the agents.”
In models like the one proposed below, where the interaction
of the agents is determined by past experience and the agents
continually adapt to that experience, mathematical analysis
is typically very limited in its ability to derive the dynamic
consequences. In this case, agent-based modelling might be
the only practical method of analysis.
We follow a ‘bottom-up’ approach, after a brief overview
of the methods used in section VII which follows, in sections
IV-B and IV-C we describe the first principles of agent
behaviour and in section V we analyse the macro-properties
emerging from the agent interactions.
B. The setting
In this section, the model used for the simulation of the
DBE environment is set out.
SMEs are modelled as agents in a multi-agent system. The
services the SMEs provide are modelled as bit strings in the
same manner software services are modelled in [2], each bit
symbolising a feature of the service. Finally, the underlying
market is modelled by a set of requests (market needs) which
are exogenous and are generated randomly. A request is a bit
string of the same size as a service bit string.
Each SME has a population (or portfolio) of services. This
population is not static throughout the lifetime of the SME. If
a service is successful, the SME tends to add similar services
to the portfolio while an unsuccessful service is usually
discarded. The whole process is modelled quite elegantly by
a genetic algorithm (GA) within the portfolio which involves
mutation and crossover with survival of the fittest. Through
this population each SME can choose which request it will
try to satisfy. The genetic algorithm represents the R&D
businesses perform in order to improve their services. An
overview of genetic algorithms is given in appendix VII.
The use of genetic algorithms is a natural and simple way
to model R&D, with minimal assumptions. The GA captures
the following characteristics:
1) trying to find a solution to a particular problem,
2) using a population of possible solutions.
Any other method that can capture the above two characteris-
tics may be used in place of the GA.
The objective of an SME is to increase its fitness. Each
SME maintains a portfolio of candidate services, only one of
which will be submitted to the market. Each candidate service
receives a rating according to how profitable it would be for
the SME if it was submitted to the market. This calculation is
performed using the services submitted by all other SMEs in
the previous round. The rating of each candidate service within
the SME portfolio is used to: a) decide on which service to
submit to the market and b) evolve the best services in the
portfolio (with mutation and crossover) and eliminate the worst
services.
The fitness of a service measures how profitable it is to its
owner. The profitability of a service depends on:
1) how close the service is to the market needs (service-
request similarity) and
2) how many other services satisfy those needs (limited
demand).
The fitness of an SME equals the fitness of the service it
offers.
In the section that follows we discuss the factors that affect
the fitness (or profitability) of a service.
1) Service-Request Similarity and Limited Demand: As-
sume there are m SMEs in the market, each one offering
a single service. Consider a service S and a request R,
each represented by a bit string of fixed length. Similarity is
measured by the percentage of shared bit values between S and
R, denoted by d(Ri, Sj), 0 ≤ d ≤ 1. If the market requests are
R1, R2, ..., Rn, services in the market are S1(t), . . . , Sm(t),
the fitness of a service Sj(t) is
Uj(t) =
n∑
i=0
(φ(Ri, Sj(t))× ρi(t)), (1)
where
φ(Ri, Sj(t)) = e
−
1−d(Ri,Sj(t))
α2 . (2)
The variable φ is used to parametrise the fitness landscape
(make maxima more or less pronounced), α being a shape
parameter. Figure 1 shows the relationship of φ with with the
similarity d. The weight/discounting factor ρ is given by
ρi(t) = min
{
1,
1∑
j=1 φ(Ri, Sj(t))
}
. (3)
The variable ρ models the fact that the demand in the market
is limited. When a request is saturated (i.e. too many services
try to satisfy it) then ρ < 1. Subsequently, the fitness of the
service is discounted. Otherwise, when ρ = 1 the fitness of
the service equals φ.
The fitness of an SME is equal to the fitness of the service
it submits to the market.
2) Satisfaction of Requests and Market Efficiency: An
additional useful measure is the degree to which a request
is satisfied. This is a metric of how saturated it is, in terms
of how many services try to satisfy it and how similar their
features are to those of the request. The degree of satisfaction
Qi(t) of a request Ri at round t is given by:
Qi(t) =
m∑
j=1
φ(Ri, Sj(t)). (4)
This measure is necessary for assessing the efficiency of the
DBE market. As discussed in section II-B, in an efficient
DBE market all the market requests will be equally saturated,
assuming there is the same demand for all of them. Thus, we
calculate the standard deviation σ(t) of the satisfaction values
of all the requests in the market at round t. The smaller it
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Fig. 1. The relationship of φ with the service-request similarity d for a = 0.2.
The variable φ is used to parametrise the fitness landscape (make maxima
more or less pronounced).
is, the more similar to each other the saturation levels of the
requests are.
σ(t) = stdev{Q1(t), . . . , Qn(t)} (5)
The mean of the saturation values will be constant due to the
demand in the model being fixed.
C. Exchange of Services
As outlined in III-A exchange of services may encompass
many real-life situations that occur in a market. These include
the forming of strategic partnerships of companies, partici-
pation in free/open source projects and others. The setting
described here is a loose model of such situations which aims
to identify the basic factors that lead to this general behaviour
of exchanging.
In our model, the exchange involves selecting a set of
services from one SME’s portfolio and swapping them with
the corresponding set of services of the other SME’s portfolio.
When a company chooses to swap a set of services, this means
that after the exchange has taken place it won’t have these
services in its portfolio any more. The services in a portfolio
of a company are sorted according to their fitness (i.e. how
profitable they are to the SME that owns them). The model in
its current state supports exchange of services that are in the
same rank, in the two portfolios, e.g. the 5th service in the
portfolio of one SME with the 5th service in the portfolio of
the other4.
At each time tick, the SMEs need to decide whether they
want to exchange some of their services with one of the other
SMEs. A statistical classification algorithm is used to model
the decision problems an individual agent faces. An overview
of statistical classification is given in Appendix VII.
4Experiments have shown that the rank of the services being exchanged is
not of much significance, assuming that services of the same rank are being
exchanged, but we plan to investigate this further in the future.
1) Exchange decisions: Every SME has a classifier system
which it uses to decide on whether they want to exchange
some of their services with one of the other SMEs. The rules
of the classifier are shown in table I below. The objective of
an SME at all times is to increase its fitness.
The rules’ condition part refers to the rank of the SME
in the market with respect to the rank of its colleagues. The
action part examines the potential partner’s rank and prompts
the SMEs either to engage in an exchange with a specific
type of partner or abstain from exchanging. For simplicity, the
SMEs are clustered in three5 groups according to their rank.
Therefore we have upper, middle and lower ranked SMEs. For
an exchange to take place both parties need to agree.
We experiment both with settings in which the rank is based
on the fitness of each company and others where the rank is
not linked to SME performance in any way. For example,
in experiments where rank is based on SME performance,
the SME with the highest fitness will have rank = 1,
whilst the SME with the lowest fitness will have rank =
number of SMEs. On the other hand, in experiments where
rank is unrelated to performance in the market the rank of
an SME may be its id number. In section V we analyse these
experiments and present the effect the different meanings rank
may take have on the learning that occurs.
if my rank = lower then exchange with lower cluster, s1
if my rank = lower then exchange with middle cluster, s2
if my rank = lower then exchange with upper cluster, s3
if my rank = lower then do not exchange, s4
if my rank = middle then exchange with lower cluster, s5
if my rank = middle then exchange with middle cluster, s6
if my rank = middle then exchange with upper cluster, s7
if my rank = middle then do not exchange, s8
if my rank = upper then exchange with lower cluster, s9
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
TABLE I
A FEW EXAMPLE RULES OF THE CLASSIFIER WHICH AN SME USES TO
DECIDE ON WHAT TYPE OF PARTNER TO CHOOSE FOR AN EXCHANGE.
The classifier system operates as follows [31]. First, it
examines the if part of each rule to determine and shortlist
the rules whose conditions are satisfied at a given time t. It
then assigns a score b to the shortlisted rules, sk being the
strength of the kth rule:
bk(t) = sk(t) + ε,where ε ≃ N(0, σ). (6)
The rule with the highest score b becomes the active rule.
After the active rule has been executed and has generated
payoff ω during the previous round t−1, the classifier system
updates its strength s:
sk = sk(t−1)−csk(t−1)+cω(t−1),where c ∈ [0, 1]. (7)
In other words, ∆sk(t) = c[ω(t−1)−sk(t−1)]. Therefore,
as long as the payoff in round t−1 is greater than the strength
5Experiments have been carried out which showed that model behaviour
doesn’t vary significantly with cluster size. Three is the optimal number of
clusters with respect to having a model which is realistic enough while taking
a reasonable amount of time to execute and giving us the ability to present
the results in an efficient and clear way.
6of the rule on that round, the strength will increase. If the
selection of the rule led to a small payoff being generated,
the strength of the rule will decrease, making it less likely to
be activated in the future. The strength of each rule converges
to some weighted average of the rewards ω generated by the
environment in response to that specific rule.
In our implementation of the model all the rules have initial
strength 0. The rule strengths are adjusted as the simulation
goes on. The strength of each rule that is activated is updated
at every round using the following payoff from the external
environment: ω(t) = Uj(t) − Uj(t − 1). In other words,
the payoff is the difference in the fitness of the company
between the current and the previous round. The payoff may
be negative, zero, or positive according to the change in fitness.
2) Exchange decisions resolution: Once the companies that
have decided to participate in an exchange have selected the
type of partner they prefer, they are teamed up accordingly.
For instance, an SME in the cluster of middle ranked SMEs,
who has decided to exchange with a high fitness company
will be coupled with a high ranked company who wants to
exchange with a middle ranked one. If a suitable partner is
not found the exchange does not happen. The strength of the
rule that was activated in that case will still be updated even
if the transaction was not carried out. This reflects the effect
choosing a partner who is unwilling to collaborate has on the
fitness of the company.
D. Discussion
The model outlined above is simple in that it has captured
the main aspects of a digital business ecosystem. It is the
model of a market in which the companies try to satisfy a set
of underlying requests. They do so by producing and making
available services that are as close as possible to the specified
requests. Each company has its own R&D portfolio of services
that it evolves. At each round the companies go to the market
with what they believe is the best service in their portfolio. In
addition, the companies have an option to exchange services
with partners that they select themselves.
The simplicity of the model is also inherent in the behaviour
of the agents. The agents have to find which is the best service
to make available, based on the services that were submitted
to the market during the previous round. Also, they need to
decide whether and with whom to exchange their services
based on their rank in the market. These are all abstractions
from reality. We do not assume any network effects in the
market. Also, there are no indicators about value of the brand
of a company.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE MODEL
In this section the experiments carried out using the model
of the DBE are described. The analysis focuses on two main
findings:
1) The companies discover themselves that under certain
circumstances it is beneficial to them to exchange ser-
vices between them.
2) Allowing exchange to take place in the market, makes
for greater market efficiency levels.
It is important at this point to stress that the choice to
exchange services is not a practice that is imposed by the
model mechanism. Instead, it is a feature that emerges from
the classifiers as it is a gainful practice for the companies
under certain circumstances.
The model behaviour is quite general and has been observed
for a very wide range of parameters and initial conditions. The
graphs and figures shown below come from randomly selected
runs of the simulation, unless it is stated otherwise.
A. Service Exchange
1) Exchange Decision: As described in section IV-C each
agent/company uses a classifier to decide whether or not to
exchange some of its services. The decision is based on the
company’s rank in the market. Figures 2(a) and 2(b) show the
average strength of the rules of all the companies’ classifiers
at the end of a simulation which lasted for 10 000 iterations.
The companies are ranked according to their fitness. The fittest
company will have rank 1 whilst the least fit company will
have rank equal to the number of companies in the market. To
make for less time consuming simulations and more readable
graphs the companies are grouped into three clusters according
to their rank; so they are divided into lower, mid and upper
ranked SMEs. Figure 2(a) was generated from a run of the
simulation where the DBE market consisted of 21 SMEs,
each having 20 services in its portfolio. Each service had
10 features. There were 4 software requests in the market,
generated randomly. The run of the simulation which produced
figure 2(b) had largely similar parameters, the difference being
that there were 30 services in the SMEs’ portfolios and there
were 5 requests in the market.
The strongest of the rules at each situation is the one which
is more likely to be activated. In other words, it is shown in
figures 2(a) and 2(b) that if a company belongs to the mid
or lower cluster it is likely that it will choose to participate
in an exchange (preferably with a upper ranked company)
while if it belongs to the upper ranked cluster it will avoid
engaging in any exchange activities. The graphs show that in
the less successful, lower ranked SMEs the classifier rules that
correspond to exchange actions have higher strengths than
the rule that leads SMEs not to exchange. The opposite holds
for higher ranked SMEs, i.e. the rule that corresponds to a not
exchange action has higher strength than the exchange
rules. For mid-ranked SMEs, a rule prompting the firm to
exchange is the stronger of all, but exchanging is not always
a profitable practice; the rule that leads the SME to avoid
exchanging is often stronger than some exchange rules.
The generality in the behaviour of the model is confirmed by
figure 2(c). A wide range of parameters and initial conditions
were varied in a total of 200 experiments, keeping the number
of SMEs in the market constant (21). Figure 2(c) shows the
average values of the SME classifiers’ strengths over those
200 experiments. The general trend which emerges is that the
average performing (mid cluster) and worst performing (lower
cluster) SMEs learn that it is to their advantage to exchange
services with others while the top performers (upper cluster)
learn to avoid exchanging .
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Fig. 2. Average Exchange Rule Strength The graphs show the strength values of each rule at the end of a simulation averaged out over all SMEs’ classifiers.
The SMEs decide whether to participate in an exchange of services according to their rank. The classifier each SME has is as follows:
if my rank = lower then exchange with lower cluster, s1
if my rank = lower then exchange with middle cluster, s2
if my rank = lower then exchange with upper cluster, s3
if my rank = lower then do not exchange, s4
if my rank = middle then exchange with lower cluster, s5
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
For figures 2(a)-2(e) the rank of the SMEs is based on measures related to their fitness, while figures 2(f) and 2(g) were created for settings in which the
SME rank was unrelated to fitness. The graphs show in settings where the rank is associated with some fitness measure the SMEs that are further down in
the rank learn that is beneficial to them to participate in an exchange.
2(a) Run 1 parameters: 21 SMEs, each having 20 services in its portfolio. Each service had 10 features. There were 4 software requests in the market. The
rank was based on the fitness value of the SME.
2(b) Run 2 parameters: 21 SMEs, each having 30 services in its portfolio. Each service had 10 features. There were 5 software requests in the market. The
rank was based on the fitness value of the SME.
2(c) Average values over 200 experiments This figure confirms the generality of the behaviour of the model. A wide range of parameters and initial conditions
were varied in a total of 200 experiments, keeping the number of SMEs in the market constant (21). The rank was based on the fitness value of the SME.
2(d) and 2(e) Average Exchange Rule Strength based on SME performance measures. The SMEs decide whether to participate in an exchange of services
according to their performance. In 2(d) the performance measure deciding the rank of the SMEs is their fitness growth rate, while in 2(e) it is the 20-moving
average of the SME fitness. When the ranking of the SMEs is performance related information exchange emerges as a gainful strategy.
2(f) and 2(g) Average Exchange Rule Strength not based on SME performance measures. In 2(f) the SMEs decide whether to participate in an exchange
of services according to their unique id. In 2(g) the ranking of the SMEs is random and constantly changes. In both cases, the ranking is unrelated to SME
fitness or any other performance measure. The rule strengths indicate that no rule is significantly more important than any other one implying that the rules
are not relevant and no learning has occurred.
8To understand better the behaviour of the system we per-
formed experiments with different rankings of the SMEs.
Amongst the ranking methods we tested were variants of
the fitness ranking, as well as rankings unrelated to SME
performance altogether. The results seem to indicate that
information exchange emerges as long as the ranking is in
some way related to SME performance. We show in figure 2(d)
the rule strengths in the case the SMEs were ranked according
to fitness growth rates
∆Uj(t) = Uj(t)− Uj(t− 1), (8)
rather than fitness itself. The graphs produced are similar in
pattern to those in figure 2(c). These strengths imply that
the rules are significant and learning has taken place in the
system. Similar results, shown in figure 2(e), were produced
when SMEs were ranked according to the N-moving average
of their fitness, given by
µ =
1
N
t∑
T=t−N
Uj(T ). (9)
On the other hand, in figure 2(f) a typical case of a ranking
that is unrelated to SME fitness is shown. In that particular
case we gave the SMEs an arbitrary ranking that remained
fixed throughout the simulation. The rule strengths indicate
that no rule is significantly more important than any other one
implying that the rules are not relevant and no learning has
occurred. We also tried a completely random and constantly
changing SME ranking which produced similar results, shown
in figure 2(g).
2) Choice of Exchange Partner: An interesting result which
arose from the experiments is the choice of potential partners
for the companies who decide to exchange. In all three situ-
ations (if my rank is upper, if my rank is mid
and if my rank is lower) the strength of the rules that
prompt SMEs to exchange reveal a decreasing preference from
left to right between upper, mid and lower ranked partners.
That result is entirely intuitive and confirms the validity of
the model.
A result that might not be so obvious is the fact that the
lower ranked SMEs benefit from exchanging even between
themselves. This is reflected in the fairly high strength of the
relevant rule and it is better illustrated in figure 3.
The experiment that yielded figure 3 is as follows. To make
for a more intelligible graph, there are only six SMEs in
the market and two distinct requests. Every 400 rounds the
underlying requests in the market change. Every 200 rounds
(but not when the requests change), the lower ranked SMEs
exchanged services between them. As the purpose of this
experiment was to verify the finding that exchange among
lower ranked SMEs is beneficial, the exchange was done
deliberately and not using the classifier. As shown in figure 3,
in round 200 the exchange does not upset the equilibrium too
much as the SMEs have more or less the same fitness. In round
600 the exchange drives the lower ranked SMEs up, whilst
damaging the fitness of the others in the market. In round
1000 the exchange not only drives the under-performers up
but also causes one of them, SME1 to join the upper cluster.
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Fig. 3. This is an experiment that illustrates that exchange among lower
ranked SMEs is beneficial to them. Every 400 rounds the underlying requests
in the market change. Every 200 rounds (but not when the requests change),
the lower ranked SMEs exchanged services between them. In most instances
the exchange drives the under-performers up, in terms of fitness.
The experiment described above illustrated that exchanges
between low-ranked SMEs can be highly beneficial. This is
because the fusion of their portfolios might yield services that
enable them to operate in a new market segment, in other
words it may lead them to satisfy another request which was
previously not catered for. This can cause their rank in the
market to improve and even bring about a change of leadership
in the industry.
B. Market Efficiency
As discussed in section II-B, the increased flow of informa-
tion within the DBE, will make it easier for the participating
companies to find the right trading partners. Consequently, it
will make for greater market efficiency levels in comparison
to a conventional market (e.g. the software industry). An
interesting observation which emerged from the analysis of the
simulations carried out is that allowing the SMEs to exchange
services between them, increases the efficiency further.
A DBE market is considered efficient when all the requests
are equally saturated. In an efficient DBE market, the supply
of services will adjust immediately to any arising information
about the underlying requests. In other words, there is no
excess profit to be gained by an SME choosing to satisfy
another request than the ones it currently does. As mentioned
in section IV-B.2, the degree of satisfaction of a request R is
given by equation 4. In order to assess the level of efficiency
in the market we need to calculate the standard deviation σ(t)
of the satisfaction values of all the requests in the market,
as given by equation 5. The smaller it is, the more similar
to each other the saturation levels of the requests are. It
is important to mention at this point that the mean of the
saturation levels remains constant, because in the model we
assume equal demand for all of them, and it is equal to
number of services in the DBE
number of requests
.
Figure 4 shows the standard deviation σ(t) of the saturation
values Qi(t) of all the requests {R1, . . . , R4} in the market,
for two different runs of the DBE simulation. Both runs had
been initialised with the same parameters, for one of them
exchange between the SMEs was not permitted, whereas for
the other one the SMEs were free to exchange services with
each other according to the procedure detailed in section
9IV-C. In order to train the classifiers used for the exchange
decisions, every 500 rounds all SMEs’ portfolios were reset to
the services they had at round 0. To make comparison easier,
the resetting of the portfolios was also done during the run
where exchange was not allowed. In effect, in this experiment,
‘history’ repeats itself every 500 rounds. This is the reason
spikes occur in the graph every 500 rounds. When exchange is
permitted, the SMEs are given the chance to exchange services
with each other at rounds 250, 750, 1250, 1750, etc. The graph
shows a period of 5000 rounds, when the classifiers have been
sufficiently trained.
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Fig. 4. Market Efficiency: We assess the level of market efficiency by plotting
the standard deviation of the saturation degrees of the requests in the DBE
Market. The smaller the standard deviation, the greater the market efficiency.
The graph contrasts these data for a situation in which the SMEs are allowed
to exchange services with each other and for a situation where exchange is
not allowed. The standard deviation of the saturation degrees of the requests
is significantly smaller when exchange is allowed, indicating a more efficient
market. For classifier training purposes every 500 rounds all SMEs’ portfolios
were reset to the services they had at round 0. In the case where service
exchanges are allowed, these happen in the middle of each cycle, i.e. at rounds
250, 750, 1250, 1750, etc.
It is evident from the graph, that when exchange of services
between SMEs is allowed, the standard deviation of the
requests saturation values is considerably smaller. In other
words, the requests in the market are more evenly satisfied.
This result is quite invariant to initial conditions and pa-
rameters of the simulation. So in the system described, not
only will SMEs adopt information exchange as beneficial to
their individual progress, but it will also result in a global
improvement to the efficiency of the market. Again this is
in agreement with what is observed in real economies where
open standards, publication of innovations and dissemination
of ideas lead to highly efficient markets.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The aim of this work has been to study the rationale
as well as the effect of knowledge exchange in economic
markets. We focus especially on the software industry, our
findings, however, to some extent apply to other industries
as well. Sharing of information between commercial firms
is considered controversial. Although it is acknowledged that
when two companies join forces to develop an innovative
product they can both benefit, sharing trade secrets is not
undertaken lightly. Our main aim has been to formalise a
plausible and elegant explanation of how and why companies
adopt information exchange and why it benefits the market as
a whole when this happens.
An agent based model of a Digital Business Ecosystem
market has been implemented to assist us in understanding the
dynamics of the market mechanisms. Firms are modelled as
agents with minimal reasoning capabilities. We investigated
the properties that emerge from the agent interactions that
occur in the market. Specifically, we examined two key
characteristics that we observed in the simulations carried
out. Namely, the fact that the agents discover themselves
that under certain circumstances it is beneficial for them to
exchange services and that allowing exchange to take place in
the market, makes for greater market efficiency levels.
The technologic infrastructure of the DBE will facilitate
the dissemination of knowledge among the member SMEs,
increasing the volume and the speed of the information flowing
in the market. As a result, it is expected that it will allow for
greater market efficiency levels in comparison to a conven-
tional market. Admittedly, it is difficult to compare the market
efficiency of two different markets. However, an interesting
result arose when we performed simulations of the DBE
contrasting settings in which exchanges among SMEs were
permitted with settings where exchanges were not permitted.
Exchanges among SMEs within the DBE further increase
the efficiency of the market, which is in agreement with the
common intuition that exchanging information is ultimately
beneficial for the entire market.
The second and most important conclusion that emerged
from the DBE simulation is that exchanges between the agents
similar to the ones that happen in real-life arise naturally in
our system. At regular time intervals, the SMEs were given the
chance to decide whether they wanted to choose a partner and
swap some of their services. The decision was taken using
classifiers, which were separate for each agent. The agents
were not pre-programmed or biased in any way to engage in
exchanges. The SMEs, on their own, discovered in which cases
exchanging is beneficial for them and what type of partner is
the best. Exchange is a practice that emerges, and is not forced
upon the agents.
This work does not directly advocate knowledge exchange
as a means of increasing profitability of software companies.
Knowledge exchange, is indeed an already existing phe-
nomenon in industry as explained in section III-A. The results
presented merely serve as a demonstration of a parsimonious
set of assumptions that give rise to exchange in a software
market. In other words, we identify the substance of this
phenomenon, ridding it from unnecessary assumptions, like
network effects, social issues of trust, or managerial strategies
and show the minimal set of assumptions that allow it to
emerge.
VII. METHODOLOGY: EVOLUTIONARY ALGORITHMS
In order to model evolution in populations as well as
learning we have used several evolutionary algorithms in our
model. In this section we give a brief overview of these
algorithms.
Evolutionary algorithms [7] ‘is an umbrella term employed
to describe computer-based problem solving systems which
use computational models of some of the known mechanisms
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of evolution as key elements in their design and implementa-
tion.’ A variety of evolutionary algorithms have been proposed
by several researchers. The major ones are: genetic algorithms,
evolutionary programming, evolution strategies, classifier sys-
tems and genetic programming. They all share a common
concept of simulating the evolution of objects/structures using
the processes of selection, mutation and reproduction. The
processes depend on the performance/fitness of the individuals
under consideration as defined by their environment and
quantified by a fitness function.
More precisely, evolutionary algorithms maintain a popula-
tion of structures, that evolve according to rules of selection
and other operators, that are referred to as “search operators”
(or genetic operators), such as recombination and mutation.
Each individual in the population receives a measure of its
fitness in the environment. Reproduction focuses attention on
high fitness individuals, thus exploiting the available fitness
information. Recombination and mutation perturb those indi-
viduals, providing general heuristics for exploration. Although
simplistic, these algorithms are sufficiently complex to provide
robust and powerful adaptive search mechanisms.
A genetic algorithm (GA) [21] is a model of machine
learning inspired by the mechanisms of genetics, which has
been applied to optimisation. It operates with an initial pop-
ulation containing a number of trial solutions. Each member
of the population is evaluated (to yield a fitness) and a new
generation is created from the better of them. The process is
continued through a number of generations with the aim that
the population should evolve to contain an acceptable solution.
In [36] it is stated that GAs are particularly suitable for solving
complex optimization problems and hence for applications that
require adaptive problem-solving strategies. In order to make
genetic algorithms reach an optimal solution faster, parallel
implementations of GAs are often used [9].
Genetic algorithms are used for a number of different appli-
cation areas. An example of this would be multidimensional
optimisation problems in which the character string of the
chromosome can be used to encode the values for the different
parameters being optimised.
In practice, therefore, we can implement this genetic model
of computation by having arrays of bits or characters to rep-
resent the chromosomes. Simple bit manipulation operations
allow the implementation of crossover, mutation as well as
other operations. Crossover involves combining strings to swap
values, e.g. 101001 + 111111 → 101111. Mutation involves
spontaneous alteration of characters in a string, e.g. 000101→
100101. Although a substantial amount of research has been
performed on variable-length strings and other structures, the
majority of work with genetic algorithms is focused on fixed-
length character strings.
Statistical classification is a type of supervised learning
algorithm which takes a feature representation of an object or
concept and maps it to a classification label. A classification
algorithm is designed to learn, or in other words, to approx-
imate the behaviour of a function which maps a vector of
features [X1, X2, ..., Xn] into one of several classes by looking
at several input-output examples of the function.
An instance of a classification algorithm is called a classi-
fier. Learning Classifier Systems [25] are a machine learn-
ing technique which combines evolutionary computing and
reinforcement learning to produce adaptive systems. It is a
minimal form of modelling learning in the sense that it is
not necessary to make assumptions about the way the agents
perform their reasoning. In addition to that, the absence of any
assumptions or biases in the learning process leads to results
that can be generalised. A classifier consists of a set of rules,
which have a condition C (if part) an action A (then part)
and a strength measure s. An example of a classifier system
is shown in table II.
if C1 then A1, s1
if C2 then A2, s2
if C3 then A3, s3
if . . . then . . . . . .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
TABLE II
AN EXAMPLE OF A CLASSIFIER SYSTEM.
In the model described in detail in section IV-B, genetic
algorithms and classification algorithms have been used to
model evolution of populations of solutions and learning.
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